If I recall the book correctly, one of the guardrails was that an elected representative was the legitimate representative--and had all the rights and privileges to participate in congress and legislatures. No one really disputed this.

At the end of the debate, a vote was taken and the decision was made. Representatives moved on to the next bill.

If some representatives wanted another representative out, they would use the internal party elections or general elections to achieve that.

But these days, both sides are trying to delegitimize the other side, long before the election. And it doesn't matter what the position; if it comes from the other side, it must be bad.

If I recall the book correctly, the two authors use Latin American countries as an example. While these countries adopted a constitution similar to the USA, they really did not find the guardrail of the legitimacy of the elected representative. Hence, these countries have had a culture of attacking characters instead of positions---for a long time. And their democracy has been somewhat fleeting. So say the authors.

Canada has an interesting guardrail. A governing party needs about 160 MPs to form a majority government. But real influence comes from the 25 cabinet positions and unelected members of the prime minister's office. The other 135 MPs really don't have a lot of influence to shape policy. They get told how to vote.

But the government cannot afford to piss off these MPs too much. If enough governing MPs decide not to support a government initive, the government can fall. In this way, the government should feel out these 135 MPs beforehand. So there is a guardrail that requires the government to give a the 135 MPS a sliver of influence.

This feature is not directly in our constitution. But it is a good guardrail.

The UK parliament is governed more by traditions than rules. It'll be interesting to see if the Conservatives will actually hold an election when the tradition expects them to hold the election.